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dc.contributor.authorRobertson, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorWinkelman, D. Alex
dc.contributor.authorBergstrand, Kelly
dc.contributor.authorModzelewski, Darren
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-30T00:21:45Z
dc.date.available2017-03-30T00:21:45Z
dc.date.issued2016-12
dc.identifier.citationThe Appearance and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation 2016, 8 (2):375 Journal of Legal Analysisen
dc.identifier.issn2161-7201
dc.identifier.issn1946-5319
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/jla/law006
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/622914
dc.description.abstractThe Supreme Court says that campaign finance regulations are unconstitutional unless they target "quid pro quo" corruption or its appearance. To test those appearances, we fielded two studies. First, in a highly realistic simulation, three grand juries deliberated on charges that a campaign spender bribed a Congressperson. Second, 1271 representative online respondents considered whether to convict, with five variables manipulated randomly. In both studies, jurors found quid pro quo corruption for behaviors they believed to be common. This research suggests that Supreme Court decisions were wrongly decided, and that Congress and the states have greater authority to regulate campaign finance. Prosecutions for bribery raise serious problems for the First Amendment, due process, and separation of powers. Safe harbors may be a solution.
dc.description.sponsorshipEdmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard Universityen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOXFORD UNIV PRESSen
dc.relation.urlhttps://academic.oup.com/jla/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/jla/law006en
dc.rights© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business at Harvard Law School. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).en
dc.titleTHE APPEARANCE AND THE REALITY OF QUID PRO QUO CORRUPTION: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniv Arizona, James E Rogers Coll Law, Res & Innovaten
dc.contributor.departmentUniv Arizona, James E Rogers Coll Law, Lawen
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Legal Analysisen
dc.description.noteOpen Access Journal.en
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen
refterms.dateFOA2018-09-11T18:06:59Z
html.description.abstractThe Supreme Court says that campaign finance regulations are unconstitutional unless they target "quid pro quo" corruption or its appearance. To test those appearances, we fielded two studies. First, in a highly realistic simulation, three grand juries deliberated on charges that a campaign spender bribed a Congressperson. Second, 1271 representative online respondents considered whether to convict, with five variables manipulated randomly. In both studies, jurors found quid pro quo corruption for behaviors they believed to be common. This research suggests that Supreme Court decisions were wrongly decided, and that Congress and the states have greater authority to regulate campaign finance. Prosecutions for bribery raise serious problems for the First Amendment, due process, and separation of powers. Safe harbors may be a solution.


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