Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorTosi, Justin
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-11T22:14:32Z
dc.date.available2017-05-11T22:14:32Z
dc.date.issued2017-03
dc.identifier.citationThe Possibility of a Fair Play Account of Legitimacy 2017, 30 (1):88 Ratioen
dc.identifier.issn00340006
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/rati.12114
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/623484
dc.description.abstractThe philosophical literature on state legitimacy has recently seen a significant conceptual revision. Several philosophers have argued that the state's right to rule is better characterized not as a claim right to obedience, but as a power right. There have been few attempts to show that traditional justifications for the claim right might also be used to justify a power right, and there have been no such attempts involving the principle of fair play, which is widely regarded as the most promising basis for a claim right to obedience. William Edmundson argues that the principle of fair play cannot generate power rights, and so any attempt at a fair play account of legitimacy must fail. I explain how fair play could generate a power right, owing to its stipulation that the rules of a cooperative scheme specify the form of participants' repayment.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.urlhttp://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/rati.12114en
dc.rights© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.en
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.titleThe Possibility of a Fair Play Account of Legitimacyen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Arizona Philosophy Departmenten
dc.identifier.journalRatioen
dc.description.note24 month embargo; Version of record online: 21 July 2015en
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of Arizona, Philosophy Department; P. O. Box 210027 Tucson AZ 85721-0027 United States
refterms.dateFOA2017-07-22T00:00:00Z
html.description.abstractThe philosophical literature on state legitimacy has recently seen a significant conceptual revision. Several philosophers have argued that the state's right to rule is better characterized not as a claim right to obedience, but as a power right. There have been few attempts to show that traditional justifications for the claim right might also be used to justify a power right, and there have been no such attempts involving the principle of fair play, which is widely regarded as the most promising basis for a claim right to obedience. William Edmundson argues that the principle of fair play cannot generate power rights, and so any attempt at a fair play account of legitimacy must fail. I explain how fair play could generate a power right, owing to its stipulation that the rules of a cooperative scheme specify the form of participants' repayment.


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Tosi_Legitimacy_7.2.15.pdf
Size:
69.71Kb
Format:
PDF
Description:
Final Accepted Manuscript

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record