The Impossibility of Source Freedom on Determinism
| dc.contributor.advisor | McKenna, Michael | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Deeming, Jack | |
| dc.creator | Deeming, Jack | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-27T18:49:44Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-07-27T18:49:44Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Deeming, Jack. (2017). The Impossibility of Source Freedom on Determinism (Bachelor's thesis, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA). | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10150/624953 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Free will can be understood as a particular type of control exercised by an agent over her actions. This type of control requires both the existence of genuine alternatives and a degree of authorship regarding the mental states that motivate action. This paper argues that neither of these criteria can be met if metaphysical determinism obtains. Free choice, however, may still exist just so long as an agent can willfully generate action without constraint or outside coercion. It is this freedom of choice which is required for moral responsibility. | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.publisher | The University of Arizona. | en |
| dc.rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
| dc.title | The Impossibility of Source Freedom on Determinism | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en |
| dc.type | Electronic Thesis | en |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Arizona | en |
| thesis.degree.level | bachelors | en |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Honors College | en |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en |
| thesis.degree.name | B.S. | en |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2018-06-24T06:25:12Z | |
| html.description.abstract | Free will can be understood as a particular type of control exercised by an agent over her actions. This type of control requires both the existence of genuine alternatives and a degree of authorship regarding the mental states that motivate action. This paper argues that neither of these criteria can be met if metaphysical determinism obtains. Free choice, however, may still exist just so long as an agent can willfully generate action without constraint or outside coercion. It is this freedom of choice which is required for moral responsibility. |
