AuthorSolis, Eric Matthew
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PublisherThe University of Arizona.
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
AbstractIn this thesis I provide an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of moral vice and argue (1) that Aristotle's account is consistent, and (2) that Aristotle is not committed to the view that all vicious agents are incapable of improving their characters. The main argument attempts to show that a proper interpretation of Aristotle's account of vice must observe a distinction between what Aristotle recognizes as two distinct sorts of vicious agents: those who are capable of change, and those who are not. I argue that this distinction amounts to the same thing as what I call the distinction between curably and incurably vicious agents. Recognizing this distinction and drawing out the ideas which ground it, I argue, shows that Aristotle's account of vice is consistent, and that he is not committed to the view that all vicious agents are incapable of improving their characters.
Degree ProgramGraduate College