AffiliationUniversity of Arizona
MetadataShow full item record
PublisherJ PHILOSOPHY INC
CitationPAP-Style Cases 2016, 113 (11):533 Journal of Philosophy
JournalJournal of Philosophy
Rights© 2016 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Collection InformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at email@example.com.
AbstractOver the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model, which states that acting freely consists (at least partly) in being able to do otherwise, and, more recently, the actual-sequence model, which states that acting freely is exclusively a function of the actual sequence of events issuing in our behavior. In general, a natural strategy when trying to decide between two models of a certain concept is to look for examples that support one model and undermine the other. Frankfurt-style cases have been used for this kind of purpose, to challenge the alternative-possibilities view and support the actual-sequence view. In this paper I examine the prospects of the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases: “PAP-style” cases, or cases that could be used to support the alternative-possibilities view and challenge the actual-sequence view. I argue that there are no successful PAP-style cases.
Note12 month embargo; published November 2016
VersionFinal accepted manuscript