Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study
AffiliationUniversity of Arizona
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CitationInformation Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study 2017, 28 (2):289 Information Systems Research
JournalInformation Systems Research
RightsCopyright: © 2017 INFORMS
Collection InformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at email@example.com.
AbstractThere are many contexts where an "everybody else is doing it" attitude is relevant. We evaluate the impact of this attitude in a multi-threshold public goods game. We use a lab experiment to study the role of providing information about contribution behavior to targeted subsets of individuals, and its effect on coordination. Treatments include one in which no information is provided and three others that vary in whom we provide information to: a random sample of subjects; those whose contributions are below the average of their group, and those whose contributions are above the average of their group. We find that the random provision of information is no different than not providing information at all. More importantly, average contributions improve with targeted treatments. Coordination waste is also lower with targeted treatments. The insights from this research are relevant more broadly to contexts including piracy, open innovation, and crowdfunding.
Note12 month embargo; published online: March 23, 2017
VersionFinal accepted manuscript