AffiliationUniv Arizona, Eller Coll Management
MetadataShow full item record
PublisherCAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
CitationIntintoli, V., Kahle, K., & Zhao, W. (2018). Director Connectedness: Monitoring Efficacy and Career Prospects. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(1), 65-108. doi:10.1017/S0022109018000017
Rights© Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018.
Collection InformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at email@example.com.
AbstractWe examine a specific channel through which director connectedness may improve monitoring: financial reporting quality. We find that the connectedness of independent, nonco-opted audit committee members has a positive effect on financial reporting quality and accounting conservatism. The effect is not significant for non-audit committee or co-opted audit committee members. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate self-selection. Consistent with connected directors being valuable, the market reacts more negatively to the deaths of highly connected directors than to the deaths of less connected directors. Better connected directors also have better career prospects, suggesting they have greater incentives to monitor.
Note12 month embargo; published online: 14 February 2018
VersionFinal published version