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dc.contributor.advisorWILLIAMS, RYAN
dc.contributor.authorYin, Sirui
dc.creatorYin, Sirui
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-21T19:43:06Z
dc.date.available2018-05-21T19:43:06Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/627729
dc.description.abstractUsing the compensation gap between a CEO and the highest-paid CEO in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as a proxy for local tournament incentives, I document a positive relation between local tournament incentives and firm risk. Specifically, CEOs who face higher local incentives implement riskier policies, including higher R&D expenditures and less diversification. Exploiting quasi-shocks to local incentives and cross-sectional variation in the probability of winning, I show that the incentive effects vary systematically with theoretical predictions. The results are robust to alternative local tournament incentives measures, sample periods, and firm risk proxies.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.titleLocal Tournament Incentives and Firm Risken_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberKLASA, SANDY
dc.contributor.committeememberKINI, OMESH
dc.contributor.committeememberBONAIME, ALICE
dc.contributor.committeememberWOUTERSEN, TIEMEN
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineManagementen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
refterms.dateFOA2018-05-21T19:43:06Z


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