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    The Braess Paradox and Coordination Failure in Directed Networks with Mixed Externalities

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    Name:
    BP_with_Mixed_Externalities-PO ...
    Size:
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    Description:
    Final Accepted Manuscript
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    Author
    Mak, Vincent
    Seale, Darryl A.
    Gisches, Eyran J.
    Yang, Rui
    Cheng, Meng
    Moon, Myounghee
    Rapoport, Amnon
    Affiliation
    Univ Arizona
    Issue Date
    2018-04
    Keywords
    Braess Paradox
    transportation networks
    positive and negative network externalities
    choice observability
    coordination
    experiments
    behavioral operations
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    WILEY
    Citation
    Mak, V. , Seale, D. A., Gisches, E. J., Yang, R. , Cheng, M. , Moon, M. and Rapoport, A. (2018), The Braess Paradox and Coordination Failure in Directed Networks with Mixed Externalities. Prod Oper Manag, 27: 717-733. doi:10.1111/poms.12827
    Journal
    PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
    Rights
    © 2017 Production and Operations Management Society
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    The Braess Paradox (BP) illustrates an important counterintuitive observation that adding links to a directed transportation network with usage externalities may raise the costs of all users. Research on the BP traditionally focuses on congestible networks. We propose and experimentally test a new and more dramatic version of the BP, where the network exhibits both congestion (negative externalities) and cost-sharing (positive externalities) characteristics. Our design also involves experimental manipulation of choice observability, where players choose routes simultaneously in one condition and sequentially in the other. We report robust behavioral evidence of the BP in both conditions. In nine of 10 sessions in the basic network, subjects coordinated successfully to achieve the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. But once the network was augmented with a new link, coordination failure resulted in a major proportion of subjects switching to a new route, resulting in a 37% average increase in individual travel cost across conditions.
    Note
    24 month embargo; published online: 29 November 2017
    ISSN
    1059-1478
    DOI
    10.1111/poms.12827
    Version
    Final accepted manuscript
    Sponsors
    NSF [SES-1418923]
    Additional Links
    https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/poms.12827
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1111/poms.12827
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