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dc.contributor.authorMak, Vincent*
dc.contributor.authorSeale, Darryl A.*
dc.contributor.authorGisches, Eyran J.*
dc.contributor.authorYang, Rui*
dc.contributor.authorCheng, Meng*
dc.contributor.authorMoon, Myounghee*
dc.contributor.authorRapoport, Amnon*
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-04T16:18:51Z
dc.date.available2018-06-04T16:18:51Z
dc.date.issued2018-04
dc.identifier.citationMak, V. , Seale, D. A., Gisches, E. J., Yang, R. , Cheng, M. , Moon, M. and Rapoport, A. (2018), The Braess Paradox and Coordination Failure in Directed Networks with Mixed Externalities. Prod Oper Manag, 27: 717-733. doi:10.1111/poms.12827en_US
dc.identifier.issn1059-1478
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/poms.12827
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/627869
dc.description.abstractThe Braess Paradox (BP) illustrates an important counterintuitive observation that adding links to a directed transportation network with usage externalities may raise the costs of all users. Research on the BP traditionally focuses on congestible networks. We propose and experimentally test a new and more dramatic version of the BP, where the network exhibits both congestion (negative externalities) and cost-sharing (positive externalities) characteristics. Our design also involves experimental manipulation of choice observability, where players choose routes simultaneously in one condition and sequentially in the other. We report robust behavioral evidence of the BP in both conditions. In nine of 10 sessions in the basic network, subjects coordinated successfully to achieve the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. But once the network was augmented with a new link, coordination failure resulted in a major proportion of subjects switching to a new route, resulting in a 37% average increase in individual travel cost across conditions.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNSF [SES-1418923]en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherWILEYen_US
dc.relation.urlhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/poms.12827en_US
dc.rights© 2017 Production and Operations Management Societyen_US
dc.subjectBraess Paradoxen_US
dc.subjecttransportation networksen_US
dc.subjectpositive and negative network externalitiesen_US
dc.subjectchoice observabilityen_US
dc.subjectcoordinationen_US
dc.subjectexperimentsen_US
dc.subjectbehavioral operationsen_US
dc.titleThe Braess Paradox and Coordination Failure in Directed Networks with Mixed Externalitiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentUniv Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.journalPRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENTen_US
dc.description.note24 month embargo; published online: 29 November 2017en_US
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten_US


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