THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN DENUCLEARIZATION NEGOTIATIONS

Abstract

Most scholars and experts on the two Koreas diverge between sanctioning and engagement when considering foreign policy directed towards a nuclear North Korea. Sanctioning, on its own, has failed to denuclearize or create regime change in North Korea, which has led overall policy to oscillate between sanctioning and engagement. This relationship between sanctioning and engagement can prove fruitful for nonproliferation negotiations as long as sanctioners understand how certain mechanisms of sanctions undermine diplomatic attempts to make deals. In this paper, I analyze the three primary types of sanctions and how they either contribute to or work against nonproliferation negotiations in the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-negotiation stages. Analysis of sanctioning theory and U.S. foreign policy with Iran and North Korea suggests that trade and financial sanctions support nonproliferation negotiations in the pre/post-negotiation stages, while symbolic sanctions may prove counterproductive during the negotiation/post-negotiation stage.