Markets as Governance Environments for Organizations at the Edge of Illegality: Insights from Social Network Analysis
Name:
ABS R&R FINAL VERISON 2017-08- ...
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1.908Mb
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Microsoft Word
Description:
Final accepted manuscript
Affiliation
School of Sociology, University of ArizonaSchool of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University
School of Sociology, University of Arizona
Issue Date
2017-10-10Keywords
Organizationsmarkets
reputation
social networks
trust
formal and informal sectors
institutional arrangements
Metadata
Show full item recordPublisher
Sage JournalsCitation
Odabaş, Meltem, Thomas J. Holt, and Ronald L. Breiger. "Markets as Governance Environments for Organizations at the Edge of Illegality: Insights From Social Network Analysis." American Behavioral Scientist 61, no. 11 (2017): 1267-1288.Journal
American Behavioral ScientistRights
© 2017 SAGE Publications.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
In the last two decades researchers have examined the practices of online forums operating markets for the sale of stolen credit card data. Participants cannot rely on traditional legal system regulations in the event of disputes betwen buyers and sellers. Thus, this analysis focuses on two forms of monitoring within these forums: one based on an emergent social network of transactions among community members (second-party monitoring), and the other consisting of regulatory (third-party) monitoring by forum administrators. Using social network analyses of a series of posts from a data market forum, the findings demonstrate that governance of these forums is enabled by their functioning as a particular kind of market that economists characterize as a platform, or two-sided market. Specifically, second- and third-party trust creating mechanisms are vital in establishing sustainability in illicit markets by increasing perceived market trustworthiness, which in turn leads to increased market demand.Note
no embargoISSN
0002-7642EISSN
1552-3381Version
Final accepted manuscriptAdditional Links
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764217734266ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1177/0002764217734266