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    “Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work

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    Author
    Collard-Wexler, Allan
    Gowrisankaran, Gautam
    Lee, Robin
    Affiliation
    Univ Arizona
    Issue Date
    2019-02-01
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
    Citation
    Allan Collard-Wexler, Gautam Gowrisankaran, and Robin S. Lee, "“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work," Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 1 (February 2019): 163-195. https://doi.org/10.1086/700729
    Journal
    JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
    Rights
    © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends Rubinstein's alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices, that is, each pair's Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.
    Note
    12 month embargo; published online: 4 January 2019
    ISSN
    0022-3808
    1537-534X
    DOI
    10.3386/w20641
    Version
    Final published version
    Sponsors
    National Science Foundation [SES-1425063]
    Additional Links
    https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700729?af=R&mobileUi=0
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.3386/w20641
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    UA Faculty Publications

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