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PublisherUNIV CHICAGO PRESS
CitationAllan Collard-Wexler, Gautam Gowrisankaran, and Robin S. Lee, "“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work," Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 1 (February 2019): 163-195. https://doi.org/10.1086/700729
JournalJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
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AbstractA "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends Rubinstein's alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices, that is, each pair's Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.
Note12 month embargo; published online: 4 January 2019
VersionFinal published version
SponsorsNational Science Foundation [SES-1425063]