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    The Evolution of Cooperation: The Role of Costly Strategy Adjustments

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    mic.20160220.pdf
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    Author
    Romero, Julian
    Rosokha, Yaroslav
    Affiliation
    Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Eller Coll Management
    Issue Date
    2019-02
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
    Citation
    Romero, Julian, and Yaroslav Rosokha. 2019. "The Evolution of Cooperation: The Role of Costly Strategy Adjustments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (1): 299-328.
    Journal
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
    Rights
    Copyright © 2019 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    We study the evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when it is costly for players to adjust their strategy. Our experimental interface allows subjects to design a comprehensive strategy that then selects actions for them in every period. We conduct lab experiments in which subjects can adjust their strategies during a repeated game but may incur a cost for doing so. We find three main results. First, subjects learn to cooperate more when adjustments are costless than when they are costly. Second, subjects make more adjustments to their strategies when adjustments are costless, but they still make adjustments even when they are costly. Finally, we find that cooperative strategies emerge over time when adjustments are costless hut not when adjustments are costly. These results highlight that within-game experimentation is critical to the rise of cooperative behavior We provide simulations based on an evolutionary algorithm to support these results.
    ISSN
    1556-5068
    DOI
    10.1257/mic.20160220
    Version
    Final published version
    Additional Links
    https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160220
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1257/mic.20160220
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    UA Faculty Publications

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