PublisherThe University of Arizona.
AbstractModality is the study of two different modes 1 of truth; possibility and necessity. These notions are completely pervasive to our everyday life, but there is a specific species that philosophers are most interested in -- metaphysical modality. Metaphysical modality hopes to capture everything that could’ve possible been and everything that must be. In the current literature on metaphysical modality, there are two competing views -- the Governance and Classification conceptions. The Governance conception argues that necessity in some way governs truth. The Classification conception argues that modality is simply a classification of what kind of a truth some particular truth is. Viewing modality in either light has rippling effects on what kinds of modal theories one can endorse. In this paper, I will present two such Classification style theories. In doing so, I aim to show that similar objections apply to both. Furthermore, I argue that any theory viewing modality through the Classification conception will be open to such objections. Lastly, I argue that the debate between the Classification and Governance conceptions should be carried out further before debate over specific theories continues.