Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDi Bartolomeo, Giovanni
dc.contributor.authorDufwenberg, Martin
dc.contributor.authorPapa, Stefano
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-16T21:55:14Z
dc.date.available2019-09-16T21:55:14Z
dc.date.issued2019-09
dc.identifier.citationDi Bartolomeo, G., Dufwenberg, M., & Papa, S. (2019). The sound of silence: A license to be selfish. Economics Letters.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.045
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/634207
dc.description.abstractWe theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE SAen_US
dc.rights© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.subjectPre-fab promisesen_US
dc.subjectTrust gameen_US
dc.subjectActive-non-communicationen_US
dc.subjectPsychological costsen_US
dc.subjectCost of lyingen_US
dc.titleThe sound of silence: A license to be selfishen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentUniv Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.journalECONOMICS LETTERSen_US
dc.description.note24 month embargo; published online: 29 May 2019en_US
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten_US
dc.source.volume182
dc.source.beginpage68-70


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
SOS-LTBS_May5-2019.pdf
Embargo:
2021-05-29
Size:
491.7Kb
Format:
PDF
Description:
Final Accepted Manuscript

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record