Effects of Shocks to the System: Evidence from Fare Change in the New York City Taxicab Industry and Electoral Gender Quotas in India

Abstract

The dissertation consists of three chapters related to the fields of Labor Economics, Development Economics, and Political Economy. In each chapter, there was a shock to the system and the research evaluates the effects of these shocks. In the first chapter, the shock was a fare change in the NYC taxicab industry which resulted in a wage increase of the drivers and I study how drivers adjust their work hours in response to this shock. I estimate the long-run elasticity of labor supply, defined as the ratio of the percentage change in hours worked to a percentage change in permanent wage, to be -0.4. This estimate is twice that of a previous study because I analyze the response of all drivers while the previous study examined only drivers who owned medallions. In the second and the third chapters, the shock is the introduction of Electoral Gender Quotas in village councils in the Indian state of Jharkhand. In the second chapter, I study the lasting effects of electoral gender quotas on the winning probability of females \emph{after} the quotas are no longer binding. I focus on mandated reserved seat quotas for females at the head of the village councils in the Indian state of Jharkhand. Using a newly compiled dataset from the first two elections (2010 and 2015) after the implementation of the quota mandate, I ask if reserving the seat of a village council head for a female in an election affects the probability of female winning the seat in the \emph{next} election. The probability of a female winning in the next election is five times higher (17\%) if the seat was reserved in the previous election, as compared to when it was not (3.3\%). This 13.7 percentage point increase due to quotas is substantial, considering the secular increase in the absence of quotas is less than 1 percentage point. In the third chapter, I study the effect of electoral gender quotas on performance. I use the same setting as that of the second chapter and ask: Do village councils subjected to mandated reserved seat quotas perform differently in the administration of the public works program than village councils not subjected to quotas? I find some differences in the administration of the public works program in village councils subjected to electoral gender quotas as compared to those not subjected to quotas. Village councils with gender quotas seem to have issued fewer job cards, have fewer days of work done, have fewer households receiving the full quota of employment, and have a lower ratio of work done by females. But they do seem to be better at meeting the work requests. The findings from the dissertation can be summarized as follows: 1. NYC Taxicab drivers likely operate on backward bending part of their labor supply curve. The results provide new insights into the labor supply behavior of individuals in an industry that is largely under scrutiny due to the entry of Uber and other ride-sharing apps. The results are informative in designing policies regulating ride-sharing apps that affect the permanent wages of NYC taxicab drivers. 2. Electoral gender quotas in the Indian village councils help females win the election even after they are no longer binding. The results suggest that temporary gender quotas can be an effective policy tool to increase long-run female political representation. The results are pertinent for affirmative action policies addressing other forms of discrimination. 3. Electoral gender quotas in the Indian village councils do not drastically worsen the performance of these councils in the administration of the public works program. The results suggest that affirmative action policies do not necessarily worsen the performance, contrary to the common claim made by opponents of affirmative action policies.