Affiliation
Univ Arizona, Eller Coll ManagementIssue Date
2019-10-12
Metadata
Show full item recordPublisher
SPRINGERCitation
Liu, X., Wei, Z. & Xiao, M. Rev Ind Organ (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-019-09733-2Rights
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
We document how online lenders exploit a flawed, new pricing mechanism in a peer-to-peer lending platform: Prosper.com. Switching from auctions to a posted-price mechanism in December 2010, Prosper assigned loan listings with different estimated loss rates into seven distinctive rating grades and adopted a single price for all listings with the same rating grade. We show that lenders adjusted their investment portfolios towards listings at the low end of the risk spectrum of each Prosper rating grade. We find heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment by lender experience, investment size, and diversification strategies. It took about 16 - 17 months for an average lender to take full advantage of the "cherry-picking" opportunity under the single-price regime, which is roughly when Prosper switched to a more flexible pricing mechanism.Note
12 month embargo; published online: 10 October 2019ISSN
0889-938XVersion
Final accepted manuscriptae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1007/s11151-019-09733-2
