When a few undermine the whole: A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing
AffiliationUniv Arizona, Eller Coll Management
Route choice in traffic networks
Heterogeneous decision makers
MetadataShow full item record
CitationRapoport, A., Qi, H., Mak, V., & Gisches, E. J. (2019). When a few undermine the whole: A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 125-137.
Rights© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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AbstractWe investigate a class of social dilemmas that arise when a heterogeneous group of agents potentially benefit from a joint enterprise such as ridesharing. Participation in the enterprise incurs positive externalities to other participants; social welfare is maximized with full participation. However, if some agents find it a dominant strategy to opt out, then the potential benefit from the enterprise will decrease, leading to more members opting out. This iterated disincentivizing effect could result in massive welfare losses. We construct a game-theoretical model to implement these social dilemmas and report experimental evidence for their existence and welfare impact. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Note36 month embargo; published online: 18 September 2019
VersionFinal accepted manuscript
SponsorsNSFNational Science Foundation (NSF) [SES-1418923]; University of Arizona; National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China [71571132, 71431005]; China Scholarship Council ProgramChina Scholarship Council