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    When a few undermine the whole: A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing

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    Name:
    Social-Dilemma-Ridesharing-JEB ...
    Embargo:
    2022-09-18
    Size:
    1.528Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Description:
    Final Accepted Manuscript
    Download
    Author
    Rapoport, Amnon
    Qi, Hang
    Mak, Vincent
    Gisches, Eyran J.
    Affiliation
    Univ Arizona, Eller Coll Management
    Issue Date
    2019-10
    Keywords
    Social dilemmas
    Ridesharing
    Cost-sharing
    Route choice in traffic networks
    Heterogeneous decision makers
    Experiment
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    ELSEVIER
    Citation
    Rapoport, A., Qi, H., Mak, V., & Gisches, E. J. (2019). When a few undermine the whole: A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 125-137.
    Journal
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
    Rights
    © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    We investigate a class of social dilemmas that arise when a heterogeneous group of agents potentially benefit from a joint enterprise such as ridesharing. Participation in the enterprise incurs positive externalities to other participants; social welfare is maximized with full participation. However, if some agents find it a dominant strategy to opt out, then the potential benefit from the enterprise will decrease, leading to more members opting out. This iterated disincentivizing effect could result in massive welfare losses. We construct a game-theoretical model to implement these social dilemmas and report experimental evidence for their existence and welfare impact. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Note
    36 month embargo; published online: 18 September 2019
    ISSN
    0167-2681
    DOI
    10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.015
    Version
    Final accepted manuscript
    Sponsors
    NSFNational Science Foundation (NSF) [SES-1418923]; University of Arizona; National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China [71571132, 71431005]; China Scholarship Council ProgramChina Scholarship Council
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.015
    Scopus Count
    Collections
    UA Faculty Publications

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