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    Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games

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    Incorp_BD_motiv_3_Feb_2019.pdf
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    Author
    Battigalli, Pierpaolo
    Corrao, Roberto
    Dufwenberg, Martin
    Affiliation
    Univ Arizona
    Issue Date
    2019-11
    Keywords
    Psychological game theory
    Belief-dependent motivation
    Intentions
    Time
    Rationalizability
    Self-confirming equilibrium
    Bayesian sequential equilibrium
    
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    Show full item record
    Publisher
    ELSEVIER
    Citation
    Battigalli, P., Corrao, R., & Dufwenberg, M. (2019). Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 167, 185-218.
    Journal
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
    Rights
    © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    Psychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and significantly generalized by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), extends the standard game theoretic framework by letting players' utility at endnodes depend on their interactive beliefs. While it is understood that a host of applications that model and/or test the role of emotional and other psychological forces find their home in PGT, the framework is abstract and comprises complex mathematical objects, such as players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus, PGT provides little guidance on how to model specific belief-dependent motivations and use them in game theoretic analysis. This paper takes steps to fill this gap. Some aspects are simplified - e.g., which beliefs matter - but others are refined and brought closer to applications by providing more structure. We start with belief-dependent motivations and show how to embed them in game forms to obtain psychological games. We emphasize the role of time and of the perception of players' intentions. We take advantage of progress made on the foundations of game theory to expand and improve on PGT solution concepts. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Note
    36 month embargo; published online: 24 June 2019
    ISSN
    0167-2681
    DOI
    10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.009
    Version
    Final accepted manuscript
    Sponsors
    ERCEuropean Research Council (ERC) [324219]; Marco Fanno scholarship
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.009
    Scopus Count
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    UA Faculty Publications

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