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dc.contributor.authorBattigalli, Pierpaolo
dc.contributor.authorCorrao, Roberto
dc.contributor.authorDufwenberg, Martin
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-27T19:04:17Z
dc.date.available2020-01-27T19:04:17Z
dc.date.issued2019-11
dc.identifier.citationBattigalli, P., Corrao, R., & Dufwenberg, M. (2019). Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 167, 185-218.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.009
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/636721
dc.description.abstractPsychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and significantly generalized by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), extends the standard game theoretic framework by letting players' utility at endnodes depend on their interactive beliefs. While it is understood that a host of applications that model and/or test the role of emotional and other psychological forces find their home in PGT, the framework is abstract and comprises complex mathematical objects, such as players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus, PGT provides little guidance on how to model specific belief-dependent motivations and use them in game theoretic analysis. This paper takes steps to fill this gap. Some aspects are simplified - e.g., which beliefs matter - but others are refined and brought closer to applications by providing more structure. We start with belief-dependent motivations and show how to embed them in game forms to obtain psychological games. We emphasize the role of time and of the perception of players' intentions. We take advantage of progress made on the foundations of game theory to expand and improve on PGT solution concepts. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipERCEuropean Research Council (ERC) [324219]; Marco Fanno scholarshipen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherELSEVIERen_US
dc.rights© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectPsychological game theoryen_US
dc.subjectBelief-dependent motivationen_US
dc.subjectIntentionsen_US
dc.subjectTimeen_US
dc.subjectRationalizabilityen_US
dc.subjectSelf-confirming equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectBayesian sequential equilibriumen_US
dc.titleIncorporating belief-dependent motivation in gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentUniv Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.journalJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATIONen_US
dc.description.note36 month embargo; published online: 24 June 2019en_US
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten_US
dc.source.volume167
dc.source.beginpage185-218


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