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    Contests with money and time: Experimental evidence on overbidding in all-pay auctions

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    12-02-2020_Time_auction_Breaba ...
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    Author
    Breaban, Adriana
    Noussair, Charles N.
    Popescu, Andreea Victoria
    Affiliation
    Univ Arizona, Dept Econ
    Univ Arizona, Econ Sci Lab
    Issue Date
    2020-03
    Keywords
    All-pay auction
    Experiment
    Time
    Overbidding
    
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    ELSEVIER
    Citation
    Breaban, A., Noussair, C. N., & Popescu, A. V. (2020). Contests with money and time: Experimental evidence on overbidding in all-pay auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 171, 391-405. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.005
    Journal
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
    Rights
    © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    Competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest. Those who spend more time become more likely to obtain the prize. We model this competition as an all-pay auction under incomplete information, and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time. In the experiment, subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time. However, they can bid, in terms of time, to leave early. The auction has an all-pay structure, so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within her group, she must stay for the additional time that she bid. We correlate behavior in this game with behavior in an isomorphic all-pay auction played with money bids. We also consider how two measures of sophistication, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) score, and performance on a probability calibration task, correlate with behavior. We find strong similarities in overall behavior between the auctions conducted with money and with time. Bidding greater than equilibrium levels is typical, and as a consequence, average earnings are negative in both auctions. Thus, the result that there is overdissipation of rent in all-pay auctions extends to competition in terms of time. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Note
    36 month embargo; published online: 19 February 2020
    ISSN
    0167-2681
    DOI
    10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.005
    Version
    Final accepted manuscript
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.005
    Scopus Count
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    UA Faculty Publications

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