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CitationTal, E. Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence. Erkenn 85, 665–672 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0042-4
Rights© Springer Nature B.V. 2018.
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AbstractThe Self-Intimation thesis has it that whatever justificatory status a proposition has, i.e., whether or not we are justified in believing it, we are justified in believing that it has that status. The Infallibility thesis has it that whatever justificatory status we are justified in believing that a proposition has, the proposition in fact has that status. Jointly, Self-Intimation and Infallibility imply that the justificatory status of a proposition (bottom-level justification) closely aligns with the justification we have about that justificatory status (top-level justification). Self-Intimation has two noteworthy implications. First, assuming that we never have sufficient justification for a proposition and for its negation, we can derive Infallibility from Self-Intimation. Interestingly, there seems to be no equivalently simple way to derive Self-Intimation from Infallibility. This asymmetry provides reason for thinking that bottom-level justification rather than top-level justification drives the explanation for why the levels of justification align. Second, Self-Intimation suggests a counterintuitive treatment of information concerning what justificatory status a proposition has (higher-order evidence). It follows from Self-Intimation that we always have justification for the truth about whether a proposition is justified for us, and therefore, that higher-order evidence could change what we should believe on this matter only by misleading us. This permits forming beliefs about whether a proposition is justified for us without regard to higher-order evidence, and thus reveals a reason for thinking that top-level justification is evidentially inert.
Note12 month embargo; published online: 26 July 2018
VersionFinal accepted manuscript