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dc.contributor.authorBonaimé, Alice
dc.contributor.authorHarford, Jarrad
dc.contributor.authorMoore, David
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-14T20:25:30Z
dc.date.available2020-07-14T20:25:30Z
dc.date.issued2020-06
dc.identifier.citationBonaimé, A., Harford, J., & Moore, D. (2020). Payout Policy Trade-Offs and the Rise of 10b5-1 Preset Repurchase Plans. Management Science. 66:6, 2762-2786. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3322en_US
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.2019.3322
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/641852
dc.description.abstractWe are the first to document and study the use of Rule 10b5-1 preset repurchase plans. Though the rule's original intent was to clarify conditions for enforcing insider trading laws, generally thought to apply to individuals classified as firm insiders, we find strong use of the rule at the firm level to repurchase company stock. We exploit this new and widespread form of payout to examine an issue at the core of payout decisions-the trade-off between commitment and financial flexibility. Relative to open market repurchases, preset plans provide an expanded repurchase window and increased legal cover, albeit at the cost of reducing repurchase flexibility and the option to time repurchases. These costs and benefits are significantly associated with Rule 10b5-1 adoption: Firms with alternative sources of financial flexibility are more likely to precommit to a repurchase plan, as are firms with a history of poor repurchase timing and firms constrained by blackout windows. Consistent with preset plans signaling commitment, Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announcements are associated with greater and faster completion rates, with more positive market reactions, and with more dividend substitution than open market repurchases. Lastly, we find that preset repurchase plans represent a unique payout tool whose introduction encouraged a different set of firms to buy back stock and significantly altered the payout landscape.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherINFORMSen_US
dc.rightsCopyright © 2020, INFORMS.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectshare repurchaseen_US
dc.subjectshare buybacken_US
dc.subjectRule 10b5-1en_US
dc.subjectpreset trading planen_US
dc.subjectaccelerated share repurchaseen_US
dc.subjectpayout policyen_US
dc.subjectfinancial crisisen_US
dc.subjectrepurchase plan completion ratesen_US
dc.subjectannouncement returnsen_US
dc.subjectfinancial flexibilityen_US
dc.subjectblackout windowsen_US
dc.subjectdividend substitutionen_US
dc.titlePayout Policy Trade-Offs and the Rise of 10b5-1 Preset Repurchase Plansen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1526-5501
dc.contributor.departmentUniv Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.journalMANAGEMENT SCIENCEen_US
dc.description.note12 month embargo; published online: 29 January 2020en_US
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten_US
dc.source.journaltitleManagement Science
dc.source.volume66
dc.source.issue6
dc.source.beginpage2762
dc.source.endpage2786


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