JUSTICE AS EFFICIENCY: A STUDY OF PLAUSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL REFORM

Abstract

The U.S. Congress has become less productive since the 1970’s. Although many factors contribute to this decrease in productivity, I will examine how diminished institutional capacity and the increased influence of special interest groups have contributed to that decrease. I begin by empirically establishing the decline in Congress’ productivity as measured by the year-over-year decrease in total passage of legislation. Then, I will examine how diminished institutional capacity has enabled this loss of productivity. I employ a market-based approach to argue that the decline is akin to a shift in supply. I make the claim that, as the supply of legislation has become scarcer, the only viable remaining market participants are lobbyists. I then outline how the increasing influence of lobbyists over the legislative process constitutes a threat to the general welfare through the proliferation of economic inequalities. I conclude by presenting a set of plausible reforms to curtail the impact of lobbyists and restrengthen the legislative branch.