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    The Moral Incompetence of Anti-corruption Experts

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    Author
    Juarez-Garcia, Mario I.
    Affiliation
    Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona
    Issue Date
    2021-01-19
    Keywords
    Corruption
    Epistemic trespassers
    Feedback mechanisms
    Moral incompetence
    Policy failure
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
    Citation
    Juarez-Garcia, M. I. (2021). The Moral Incompetence of Anti-corruption Experts. Res Publica, 1-21.
    Journal
    Res Publica
    Rights
    © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature 2021.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    This paper studies the lessons of principled anti-corruption experts who dared to fulfill their duty of justice in highly corrupt societies, through the true story of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former Finance Minister of Nigeria. My thesis is that when principled anti-corruption experts are epistemic trespassers (when they fail to identify the limits of their skills), they show moral incompetence (the tendency of principled agents to bungle moral situations). Okonjo-Iweala shows moral incompetence in two ways: she misread the opposition to her strategies and misled other honest reformers. Both actions bungled her efforts to eradicate corruption inasmuch as they hindered the possibility of finding successful anti-corruption policies. Okonjo-Iweala’s moral incompetence is, I argue, the result of her epistemic trespassing that led her to act like an expert in an environment where she was not. I conclude that, in highly corrupt societies, principled anti-corruption experts should embrace moral humility, stop thinking that they are experts, and act more like students, asking questions and not rushing to think that they understand the answers. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.
    Note
    12 month embargo; published online 19 January 2021
    ISSN
    1356-4765
    DOI
    10.1007/s11158-020-09499-5
    Version
    Final accepted manuscript
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1007/s11158-020-09499-5
    Scopus Count
    Collections
    UA Faculty Publications

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