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dc.contributor.authorKramer, Max F.
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-26T21:55:36Z
dc.date.available2021-03-26T21:55:36Z
dc.date.issued2021-03-02
dc.identifier.citationKramer, M. F. (2021). What it might be like to be a group agent. Neuroethics, 1-11.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1874-5490
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s12152-021-09459-7
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/657232
dc.description.abstractMany theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel (Philosophical Studies 172: 1697–1721, 2015) argues that yes, collective entities (including the United States, taken as a whole), may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer (Philosophia 43: 1047–1057, 2015), Tononi and Koch (Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370: 20140167–20140167, 2015) , and List (Noûs 52: 295–319, 2018) reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (Encyclopedia of Consciousness, 403–416, 2009). I argue here that List’s rejection is too quick, and that groups can, at least in principle, display the kind of informational integration we might think is necessary for consciousness. However, group consciousness will likely differ substantially from the individual experiences that give rise to it. This requires the defender of group consciousness to face up to a similar combination problem as the panpsychist. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rights© Springer Nature B.V. 2021.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en_US
dc.subjectCollective intentionalityen_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectIntegrated information theoryen_US
dc.subjectSocial groupsen_US
dc.subjectThe combination problemen_US
dc.titleWhat it Might Be like to Be a Group Agenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1874-5504
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophy, University of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.departmentProgram in Cognitive Science, University of Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.journalNeuroethicsen_US
dc.description.note12 month embargo; first published online 2 March 2021en_US
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten_US
dc.source.journaltitleNeuroethics


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