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    A Darwinian Ricker Equation

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    Author
    Cushing, Jim M.
    Affiliation
    University of Arizona
    Issue Date
    2021-01-05
    Keywords
    Chaos
    Darwinian Ricker equation
    Evolutionary game theory
    Ricker equation
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    Springer
    Citation
    Cushing, J. M. (2019, June). A Darwinian Ricker Equation. In International Conference on Difference Equations and Applications (pp. 231-243). Springer, Cham.
    Journal
    Springer Proceedings in Mathematics and Statistics
    Rights
    © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    The classic Ricker equation xt + 1= bxtexp (- cxt) has positive equilibria for b> 1 that destabilize when b> e2 after which its asymptotic dynamics are oscillatory and complex. We study an evolutionary version of the Ricker equation in which coefficients depend on a phenotypic trait subject to Darwinian evolution. We are interested in the question of whether evolution will select against or will promote complex dynamics. Toward this end, we study the existence and stability of its positive equilibria and focus on equilibrium destabilization as an indicator of the onset of complex dynamics. We find that the answer relies crucially on the speed of evolution and on how the intra-specific competition coefficient c depends on the evolving trait. In the case of a hierarchical dependence, equilibrium destabilization generally occurs after e2 when the speed of evolution is sufficiently slow (in which case we say evolution selects against complex dynamics). When evolution proceeds at a faster pace, destabilization can occur before e2 (in which case we say evolution promotes complex dynamics) provided the competition coefficient is highly sensitive to changes in the trait v. We also show that destabilization does not always result in a period doubling bifurcation, as in the non-evolutionary Ricker equation, but under certain circumstances can result in a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. © 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
    Note
    12 month embargo; first published online 5 January 2021
    ISSN
    2194-1009
    EISSN
    2194-1017
    DOI
    10.1007/978-3-030-60107-2_10
    Version
    Final accepted manuscript
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1007/978-3-030-60107-2_10
    Scopus Count
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    UA Faculty Publications

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