AffiliationPhilosophy Department, Social Sciences, University of Arizona
MetadataShow full item record
CitationSartorio, C. (2021). The grounds of our freedom. Inquiry, 1-19.
JournalInquiry (United Kingdom)
Rights© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Collection InformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org.
AbstractFrankfurt’s ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ broke with the tradition of understanding the kind of freedom required for responsibility in terms of alternative possibilities. At the same time, it inspired and motivated a new family of views in its place: views that focus exclusively on actual sequences or the actual causes of behaviour. But, what exactly does that ‘exclusiveness’ claim amount to? At first sight, it may seem natural to interpret it as the claim that the only facts that are relevant to an agent’s freedom are certain facts about actual causes. This would imply that any non-actual (counterfactual) facts are simply irrelevant to the freedom of agents. This paper argues that this interpretation is mistaken, and proposes a better one. It also discusses the related but more general question of the type of project that we are invested in when giving a theory of freedom: Are we interested in the bottom-level grounding facts, or are we interested in some higher-level facts?. © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Note18 month embargo; first published online 30 March 2021
VersionFinal accepted manuscript