Building a Society of Equals - Relational Egalitarianism on Democracy, Relationships, and Competition

Abstract

What is equality? Why do we value it? And what does an equal society look like? For relational egalitarians, equality is about individuals relate to one another: equality requires that individuals regard and treat each other as equals. Different relational egalitarians have fleshed out this idea of relational equality in different ways. This dissertation comprises four papers where I explore and examine different interpretations of relational egalitarianism and their application to three areas in political philosophy: i) the justification of democracy; ii) the ideal of equality in personal relationships; and iii) competitive institutions. For the first topic about the justification of democracy, I understand relational egalitarian accounts of democracy as defending two main claims. The first is a claim about democracy’s value: that democracy is not only instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. The second is a claim that democracy is justified because it is the embodiment of a relational egalitarian value of equal power. In the first chapter of this dissertation, “On Democracy and Intrinsic Value”, I argue that relational egalitarian attempts to defend the Intrinsic Value Thesis are unsuccessful. In general, I argue that relational egalitarians fail to provide a clear link between the purported value of egalitarian relationships and democratic procedures. I tentatively conclude therefore, that attempts to refute instrumental accounts of democracy via relational egalitarianism fail. In place of these accounts, I provide an alternative—I argue that a view which takes deliberation at the heart of democracy can better explain why democracy has intrinsic value. The second chapter “On Political Instrumentalism and the Justification of Democracy”, considers another possible interpretation of instrumentalism by Daniel Viehoff. Viehoff argues that political instrumentalism’s core concern is not with the kind of values that justify power relations, but that considerations of respect for individual agency impose limits on the kinds of goods that can justify power relations. I argue that while Viehoff’s version of instrumentalism overcomes certain longstanding criticisms of instrumentalism, it faces two problems. Chapter 3, “Respect and Equality”, turns to the second related topic—the question of why equality matters in personal relationships. On an influential strand of relational egalitarianism, we can explain why political equality matters by an appeal to egalitarian personal relationships such as friendships or marriages. On these views, equal power is a constitutive component of showing equal concern for one another. Call this the Argument from Equal Concern. I argue that while the Argument from Equal Concern seems plausible and attractive, it ultimately fails. In place of Viehoff’s account, I suggest an alternative—the Respect Model. Put briefly, the Respect Model holds that an equal distribution of power is necessary to maintain and sustain an egalitarian relationship over time by showing respect for each party’s interest and ability to shape the relationship in accordance with their own preferences, desires, and values. Finally, the fourth chapter turns to the issue of competitive institutions and their moral status in a liberal society. According to Waheed Hussain, competitive institutions pose a moral problem when they erode the relational ideal necessary for upholding political society by creating reasons for estrangement with respect to certain important goods, specifically Rawlsian Primary Goods. However, Hussain does not believe that all competition should be ruled out. Rather, we should seek to moderate the stakes of competition. Call this the Competition Proviso. Crucially, Hussain holds that his Estrangement Account only focuses on how the relational ideal of community must shape our basic institutions and does not make the further claim that the ideals for these background institutions should shape our choices within them. Call this the Strict Institutional Interpretation. In this chapter, I argue that while Hussain’s insights about the importance of community are powerful, the Estrangement Account cannot satisfy both the Competition Proviso and the Strict Institutional Interpretation. I argue that insofar as social norms link certain material goods to associational goods such as friendship or marriage, it seems inevitable that these social norms would create reasons for estrangement with respect to PSGs. If that is the case, then the Estrangement Account fails to satisfy the Competition Proviso. I then argue that to escape this problem, Hussain should abandon the Strict Institutional Interpretation. However, it seems that this might leave us in an impasse—it seems that we cannot hold onto the other liberal value of liberty while abandoning the Strict Institutional Interpretation. In the second half of the chapter, building upon Hussain’s insights about the significance of solidarity, I suggest an alternative account that can break this impasse—a relational egalitarian account. I argue that this account has important implications for our ordinary understanding of political morality and individual obligations with regards to our voluntary choices regarding the associational goods.