Essays on Political Corruption

Abstract

This dissertation contributes to the newly reinvigorated philosophical debates about political corruption. Scholars are often too optimistic when they talk about fighting corruption; the moral imperative of sanctioning corrupt officials seems to make all attempts to eradicate corrupt practices worthy of praise. Conversely, I join the disillusionment with anti-corruption policies expressed by some of the leading voices in the fight against corruption. My inquiry centers on cases in which the fight against political corruption might justify abuses of power, has been ineffective, and might be immoral. Chapter 1, “From Institutional to Individual Corruption, Once More,” discusses the dangers of resurrecting the past notion of institutional corruption (which refers to actions that undermine the purpose of political institutions) to justify policies that protect democratic equality from the influence of money. I argue that, when it comes to anti-corruption policies, we should not yearn for the past. The history of modern states, I argue, gives us reason to think that individual corruption (the misuse of public office for private gain) must be the only notion that justifies anti-corruption policies. Chapter 2, “The Moral Incompetence of Anti-Corruption Experts,” speculates about the reasons why anti-corruption reforms systematically fail in highly corrupt societies. My thesis is that when principled anti-corruption experts are epistemic trespassers (when they fail to identify the limits of their skills), they show moral incompetence (the tendency of principled agents to bungle moral situations). I conclude that, in highly corrupt societies, principled anti-corruption experts should identify the environment in which they intervene and embrace moral humility. Chapter 3, “Official Disobedience,” assesses whether the duties of public officials towards the citizens should trump their personal moral views. I defend the right of street-level bureaucrats to disobey laws that they consider unjust; I call it the right to official disobedience. Legalizing this right would accommodate public officials' moral autonomy (the fundamental value of liberal societies) and provide complementary mechanisms to safeguard just democratic institutions.