Tax evasion with a conscience
Affiliation
Department of Economics, University of ArizonaIssue Date
2021-10-09Metadata
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WileyCitation
Dufwenberg, M., & Nordblom, K. (2021). Tax evasion with a conscience. Journal of Public Economic Theory.Rights
© 2021 The Authors. Journal of Public Economic Theory published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
How do moral concerns affect fraud and detection, for example, tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring a psychological (Formula presented.) inspection game which incorporates belief-dependent guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the inspector's more than the inspectee's) as well as the policy issue whether to allow the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.Note
Open access articleISSN
1097-3923EISSN
1467-9779Version
Final published versionScopus Count
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © 2021 The Authors. Journal of Public Economic Theory published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License.