AuthorGUTIERREZ, DAVID ROBERT
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PublisherThe University of Arizona.
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AbstractIn this paper I examine the threat of epistemic circularity to our being justified in claim to reliability knowledge of our basic belief sources. I begin with Alston’s presentation of epistemic circularity and its relation to the ancient problem of the diallelus. I relate the diallelus with that of the criterion. By means of track-record argument, I consider William Alston’s treatment of the problem to orient its threat to our forming justified belief, such that majority of this paper serves to get a clear picture on what it takes to consider ourselves justified in our assumptions of reliability by means of perceptual justification. I then consider common-sense approaches to skepticism from that of G.E. Moore and Thomas Reid so as to provide reasons to accept dogmatism. It is on the basis of Crispin Wright’s conception of rational entitlement I provide reasons to accept hinge propositions to reliability claims. I focus on securing rational entitlement to these hinge-propositions so as to avoid circularity and skepticism. I put forth a reply with common-sense leanings that is largely indebted to a contextualist interpretation of Wittgenstein.