Name:
nash-bargaining-and-evolution.pdf
Size:
648.2Kb
Format:
PDF
Description:
Final Published Version
Author
Bruner, J.P.Affiliation
Department of Political Economy and Moral Science, University of ArizonaIssue Date
2021
Metadata
Show full item recordPublisher
University of Chicago PressCitation
Bruner, J. P. (2021). Nash, bargaining and evolution. Philosophy of Science.Journal
Philosophy of ScienceRights
Copyright © 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems. © 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.Note
12 month embargo; published online: 01 January 2022ISSN
0031-8248DOI
10.1086/715778Version
Final published versionae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1086/715778