Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change: The Signal of Economic Expropriation
AffiliationSchool of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona
MetadataShow full item record
CitationVilla, D., Arnon, D., & Reiter, D. (2022). Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change: The Signal of Economic Expropriation. Journal of Conflict Resolution.
JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
Rights© The Author(s) 2022.
Collection InformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at email@example.com.
AbstractWhy do major powers attempt foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC)? This article builds on existing security theory, proposing that a major power looks for signals that a government might exit that major power’s international hierarchy and/or enter an adversary’s hierarchy. Major powers are more likely to attempt FIRC against states that signal shifting preferences. The article tests the theory on American FIRC attempts from 1947 to 1989, covert and overt, failed and successful, proposing that when a hierarchy member or neutral state engaged in economic expropriation, this signaled possible exit from the US hierarchy and/or entry into the Soviet hierarchy, making a US FIRC attempt against that state more likely. It also presents an alternative theory, that economic special interests drove US FIRC attempts. Using new data on expropriations, the article supports the security theory, as expropriations by US hierarchy members made FIRC attempts more likely, but does not support the special interests theory.
VersionFinal accepted manuscript
SponsorsCharles W. Koch Foundation