• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • UA Graduate and Undergraduate Research
    • UA Theses and Dissertations
    • Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of UA Campus RepositoryCommunitiesTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournalThis CollectionTitleAuthorsIssue DateSubmit DateSubjectsPublisherJournal

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    About

    AboutUA Faculty PublicationsUA DissertationsUA Master's ThesesUA Honors ThesesUA PressUA YearbooksUA CatalogsUA Libraries

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Timely Signals of Systematic Audit Quality from Market Participants: Evidence from Activist Short-Seller Campaigns

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    azu_etd_19549_sip1_m.pdf
    Embargo:
    2024-04-27
    Size:
    930.5Kb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Author
    Zhao, Meiling
    Issue Date
    2022
    Keywords
    activist short sellers
    auditor dismissal
    auditor office
    capital market participants
    external oversight of auditors
    systematic audit quality
    Advisor
    Michas, Paul N.
    Sunder, Shyam V.
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    The University of Arizona.
    Rights
    Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction, presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
    Embargo
    Release after 04/27/2024
    Abstract
    Extant studies generally focus on signals of systematic audit quality from regulatory oversight of auditors, which can take up to several years to be revealed. Using a sample of firms targeted by activist short sellers (activists) for financial misreporting, I examine whether capital market participants provide credible and timely signals of systematic audit quality at the auditor office level. I find that activists provide timely signals of systematic audit failures at auditor offices of targeted firms (targeted offices) that exist across audits of concurrent non-targeted firms, and that these signals persist for three years on average. I also find that activist signals are more informative when the activists are more credible. Further, I document that non-targeted clients dismiss targeted offices following activist campaigns, but only when the activists are relatively credible, suggesting that clients recognize the variation in the quality of activist signals and respond accordingly. Finally, I find that audit failures revealed by activists are less persistent than those not revealed by activists, indicating that activists facilitate auditor offices’ remediation of systematic audit quality problems. Overall, my study highlights activist short-seller campaigns as a credible and timely channel through which systematic audit quality of auditor offices is signaled by market participants.
    Type
    text
    Electronic Dissertation
    Degree Name
    Ph.D.
    Degree Level
    doctoral
    Degree Program
    Graduate College
    Accounting
    Degree Grantor
    University of Arizona
    Collections
    Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    The University of Arizona Libraries | 1510 E. University Blvd. | Tucson, AZ 85721-0055
    Tel 520-621-6442 | repository@u.library.arizona.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2017  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.