AuthorChan, Hoi Yee
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PublisherThe University of Arizona.
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction, presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
AbstractMany contemporary discussions of free will share the assumption that philosophical questions related to free will are important only for reasons related to moral responsibility. In this dissertation, I explore an alternative explanation for why we may care about free will—liberty appears empty without it. This dissertation is composed of three independent chapters, which respectively address the following questions: 1. What kind of free will can we hope for? 2. What is a free agent like? 3. Why should we express our resentment if moral responsibility does not exist?
Degree ProgramGraduate College