The Psychology of Loyalty: A Solution to Hume's Problem of Moral Obligation

Abstract

This dissertation argues that moral obligations are derived from loyalty. The argument is framed as an answer to David Hume’s psychological problem of moral obligation: what is the impression from which the idea of obligation is derived. The proposal is that the idea of obligation is derived from the reflective impression of loyalty, and therefore that moral obligations are acts that fulfill the needs of those who are part of the agent’s extended self. Chapter 1 argues that Hume’s theory of moral judgment is best understood in light of his explanatory method. It shows that Hume aims to explain moral judgment by distinguishing the impression that gives rise to the concept of virtue and finding the causes of this impression. Chapter 2 develops a Humean theory of loyalty. Hume’s discussion of pride suggests a view of the self as extending to include others, and this view of the self is used to define loyalty as the tendency to act on the motive to fulfill the needs of those who are part of the agent’s extended self. Chapter 3 critiques and supplements Hume’s view of moral obligation. It argues that Hume’s moral sentiments cannot explain obligation, on their own, and that loyalty is the impression that gives rise to the idea of obligation. This leads to a new theory of moral judgment of obligation as a calibration of agent-neutral moral sentiments and agent-relative loyalty. On this view moral obligations are always acts that benefit and fulfill the needs of those who are part of the agent’s extended self. Chapter 4 responds to the challenge that loyalty cannot explain impersonal obligations. Analysis of Hume’s account of justice shows that on Hume’s view moral rules are only obligatory if they are developed and maintained as conventions of a particular group. Loyalty to the group who shares the convention defines impersonal obligations.