THE CORRUPT BARGAIN: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND A GAME THEORY OF CORRUPTION

Abstract

This paper begins by discussing how the current campaign finance system leads to a reorientation of legislators' policy preferences. Congress members have a constant need to raise funds in order to feel secure in their reelection bids, and this need for campaign cash has created a political climate in which lobbyists, corporations, and wealthy special interest groups are able to easily get their favored legislation passed while Congress remains largely unresponsive to the policy preferences of the average person. I will provide a game theoretic explanation for why firms are likely to engage in considerable political spending. Finally, I will propose a game that I believe offers a valuable model for political corruption in a representative democracy. The game I propose, named the corrupt bargain, allows representatives to gain political power and personal profit at the expense of the people they are supposed to represent. This game illustrates why corruption is so prevalent and why even those who wish to avoid corruption are likely to engage in some level of corruption.