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    International regulatory diversity over 50 years: Political entrepreneurship within fiscal constraints

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    Author
    Tarko, Vlad
    Safner, Ryan
    Affiliation
    Department of Political Economy and Moral Science, University of Arizona
    Issue Date
    2022-10-29
    Keywords
    Deficit finance
    Neoliberalism
    Political entrepreneurship
    Regulatory capitalism
    Variety of capitalism
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Publisher
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC
    Citation
    Tarko, V., & Safner, R. (2022). International regulatory diversity over 50 years: Political entrepreneurship within fiscal constraints. Public Choice, 193(1–2), 79–108.
    Journal
    Public Choice
    Rights
    © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022.
    Collection Information
    This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
    Abstract
    Over the last 50 years, economic freedom in modern capitalist democracies has increased although the regulatory state has expanded considerably, resulting in the paradox of “freer markets, more rules” (Vogel, 1996). We provide a hierarchical cluster analysis of the policy trajectories of OECD countries over the last 50 years, as well as a theoretical framework that builds on Stigler’s (1971) theory of economic regulation. Our findings suggest that these developments are not the result of ideological narratives such as “neoliberalism,” but instead we confirm some claims from the “varieties of capitalism” and “regulatory capitalism” literatures using independent methods. Our approach is better able to explain the diversity of regulatory regimes across countries than existing approaches that focus on either national patterns or policy sectors, and we also provide a fuller account of government crowding-out and crowding-in effects across the entire structure of production.
    Note
    12 month embargo; published: 29 October 2022
    ISSN
    0048-5829
    EISSN
    1573-7101
    DOI
    10.1007/s11127-022-01011-2
    Version
    Final accepted manuscript
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1007/s11127-022-01011-2
    Scopus Count
    Collections
    UA Faculty Publications

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