Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication
Affiliation
Department of Economics, University of ArizonaIssue Date
2023-01
Metadata
Show full item recordPublisher
Elsevier BVCitation
Di Bartolomeo, G., Dufwenberg, M., Papa, S., & Passarelli, F. (2023). Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication. Economics Letters, 222.Journal
Economics LettersRights
© 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.Note
24 month embargo; available online: 19 November 2022ISSN
0165-1765Version
Final accepted manuscriptae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931