Purely Dynamic Eudaimonism

Abstract

Purely Dynamic Eudaimonism (PDE) is a novel view according to which the final end of practical reasoning is virtuous activity. It stands in contrast to views which focus on the possession of virtue, views according to which our final end is the obtaining of some other state of affairs or engaging in some other activity, and views that fail to cleanly distinguish between virtue and its exercise. PDE is favourably distinguished from other eudaimonist views, such as Hursthouse's (1999), by how it engages with the intellectualism problems, and egoism objections, that face theoretical appeals to eudaimonia. In particular, problems of intellectualism are not explicitly engaged with by existing eudaimonisms, but PDE brings to light, and is partly motivated by, an appreciation of them. PDE deploys the concept of eudaimonia to explain how developing virtue involves developing a unified practical understanding of what's unconditionally valuable. The appeal to eudaimonia also enables us to better ground the aspiration to develop the virtues in human lives by explaining how that aspiration is a rational response to the sorts of challenges and conflicts that arise in any adult life. Against non-eudaimonist philosophies of happiness, such as Wolf's (2016a, 2016b, 2015; Wolf et al. 2010), PDE better accounts for how ethical improvement makes lives good; it also explains how the process of integrating our practical concerns itself contributes to making lives good. I defend PDE in three stages. Firstly, I provide a taxonomy of conceptions of happiness, giving precise accounts of the features shared by all and only eudaimonist conceptions of happiness (including a minimalist theory of virtue), while also explaining how eudaimonisms differ from one another. I then argue against representative views drawn from each category of the taxonomy, other than PDE's category. Finally, I provide positive arguments for PDE by expanding upon the minimal virtue theory common to all forms of eudaimonism. PDE is different from other eudaimonisms in holding that happiness is virtuous activity alone, that virtue is not perfectible, and that to exercise virtue is always further to develop it. These theses distinguish PDE from archetypal Aristotelian conceptions of virtue and happiness, and each has significant normative implications, which I explain and explore.