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Conventionalism and Contingency ...
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Final Accepted Manuscript
Author
Lichter, AndrewAffiliation
Philosophy Department, University of ArizonaIssue Date
2023-04-13
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Springer Science and Business Media LLCCitation
Lichter, A. Conventionalism and contingency in promissory powers. Philos Stud 180, 1769–1792 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01948-0Journal
Philosophical StudiesRights
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
Conventionalism about promising is the view that the power to make binding promises depends essentially on the existence of a social practice or convention of promising. This paper explores an objection to conventionalism that says that—(allegedly) contra conventionalism—there is no morally acceptable world in which we lack the power of promise. Instead, normative powers theorists claim that our power of promise is morally basic or necessary. I argue that the conventionalist need not deny this claim. There are several ways to develop a noncontingent conventionalism: a version of the view that can accommodate the insight that the power of promise is indispensable to morally acceptable lives. Then, I argue that the conventionalist is indeed on the hook for accommodating this insight. I wrap up by considering the state of play in the debate over conventionalism about promising. Once we note the theoretical possibility of noncontingent conventionalism, it looks like the theatre of battle shifts to the difficult question of whether “natural” morality always provides “moral necessities.”.Note
12 month embargo; first published 13 April 2023ISSN
0031-8116EISSN
1573-0883Version
Final accepted manuscriptae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1007/s11098-023-01948-0