Real-Effort Incentives in Online Labor Markets: Punishments and Rewards for Individuals and Groups
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Department of Management Information Systems, Eller College of Managements, University of ArizonaIssue Date
2024-03-01Keywords
Online labor marketFree riding
Incentive mechanism
Economic experiment
Economics of IS
Collaborative image tagging
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SOC INFORM MANAGE-MIS RES CENTCitation
Hashim, & Bockstedt, J. C. (2024). REAL-EFFORT INCENTIVES IN ONLINE LABOR MARKETS: PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS. MIS Quarterly, 48(1), 299–320. https://doi.org/10.25300/MISQ/2023/15166Journal
MIS QUARTERLYRights
Copyright of MIS Quarterly is the property of MIS Quarterly and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
Online labor markets and the humans that power them serve a critical role in the advancement of artificial intelligence and supervised machine learning via the creation of useful training datasets. The use of human effort in online labor markets is not enough, however, as a key factor is understanding the possible interventions that market operators can leverage to incentivize human effort among their labor force. We propose that platforms could implement mechanisms such as rewards or punishments at individual or group levels to incentivize real-effort and output. We apply our interventions using a collaborative image tagging experiment—a folksonomy—and the results provide interesting insights and nonobvious consequences. On average, interventions applied at the group level outperformed interventions applied at the individual level. Punishing the group provided the most controversial incentive strategy and provided a nonobvious significant improvement in effort. Rewarding or sanctioning an individual had similar effects on average, with both treatments leading to significant increases in effort post-intervention. In contrast to predictions, sanctioning appears to have significantly motivated those that were punished. Overall, the interventions applied in our real-effort collaborative image tagging experiment had a significant impact on behavior, which provides guidance for online labor market operators and the use of incentives in the creation of labeled machine learning training datasets.Note
60 month embargo; first published 01 March 2024Version
Final published versionae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.25300/MISQ/2023/15166