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dc.contributor.authorDouthit, Jeremy D.
dc.contributor.authorKachelmeier, Steven J.
dc.contributor.authorVan Landuyt, Ben W.
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-22T21:14:08Z
dc.date.available2024-05-22T21:14:08Z
dc.date.issued2024-04-10
dc.identifier.citationDouthit, J. D., Kachelmeier, S. J., & Van Landuyt, B. W. (2024). Does auditor assurance of client prosocial activities affect subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations?. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 112, 101550.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0361-3682
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.aos.2024.101550
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/672386
dc.description.abstractIn two incentivized experiments, we investigate the potential for auditor assurance of prosocial activities akin to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) initiatives to bias the initial positions and final outcomes of subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations. This possibility arises from the psychological theory of licensing, with a prosocial activity providing the motivation for licensing, while auditor assurance provides a perceived opportunity for licensing. We find that the combination of a preliminary prosocial activity by the reporter with auditor assurance of that activity leads reporters to specify more aggressive initial negotiation positions, although it does not result in more lenient initial positions by the auditor. The final outcomes of reporter-auditor negotiations are biased in the reporter's favor in our first experiment, in which auditor assurance of a prosocial reporter activity is of a social and collaborative nature. This result does not extend to our second experiment in which auditor assurance is not collaborative, although we still observe more aggressive reporters. Overall, our research identifies aggressive reporting as a potential unintended consequence of ESG assurance, especially when that assurance is of a more collaborative variety.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversity of Texas at Austinen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.rights© 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en_US
dc.subjectAccounting estimatesen_US
dc.subjectAuditor independenceen_US
dc.subjectEnvironmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)en_US
dc.subjectExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subjectFinancial reportingen_US
dc.subjectMoral licensingen_US
dc.titleDoes auditor assurance of client prosocial activities affect subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentDhaliwal-Reidy School of Accountancy, The University of Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.journalAccounting, Organizations and Societyen_US
dc.description.note24 month embargo; first published 10 April 2024en_US
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.en_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal accepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.piiS0361368224000102
dc.source.journaltitleAccounting, Organizations and Society
dc.source.volume112
dc.source.beginpage101550


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