Variations on Empirical Justification

Abstract

Empirical justification is the justification for our beliefs that is grounded in experience. In this dissertation, I defend three aspects of empirical justification that stem from Descartes' epistemological framework: foundationalism, individualism, and the epistemic privilege of experiences. Chapter 1 is an overview of the dissertation. Chapter 2 argues that contemporary theorists have overstated the case against the epistemic privilege of experiences, though I point out that there are compelling reasons for thinking this connection ought to be understood in a fallibilistic manner. Chapter 3 discusses contemporary theories of evidence and proposes a Cartesian-inspired account of evidence. Chapter 4 turns the typical discussion of skepticism and empirical justification on its head: instead of explaining how ordinary beliefs are justified in the face of skeptical threats, I aim to explain the structure of justified beliefs in skeptical threats given the falsity of skepticism qua philosophical doctrine. Chapter 5 discusses a plethora of morally loaded and ideological cases that are sometimes invoked in an attempt to cast doubt on individualistic accounts of epistemic justification. After critically analyzing these cases, I advance an individualistic theory that accommodates them.