GOING FIRST, GOING SECOND, SOLD!: OBJECT SEQUENCING IN ART AUCTIONS
Publisher
The University of Arizona.Rights
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.Abstract
This thesis considers the effect of object sequencing within art auctions on revenue. Prominent auction houses such as Sotheby's and Christie's generate billions of revenue supported by a multitude of professional decisions. The sequence objects are sold in is worthy of discussion. This thesis presents two models that utilize second-price auction formats and consider if and when object sequencing matters to revenue.Type
Electronic Thesistext
Degree Name
B.A.Degree Level
bachelorsDegree Program
EconomicsHonors College