Name:
towards-effective-appellate.pdf
Size:
412.5Kb
Format:
PDF
Description:
Final Published Version
Affiliation
Political Science and Law (by courtesy), The University of ArizonaInternational Economic Law, EUI Law, The Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (2023-2028), University of Arizona
Issue Date
2023-06-21Keywords
international arbitrationinternational dispute settlement
international institutional design
international investment law
ISDS
Metadata
Show full item recordPublisher
Cambridge University PressCitation
Kucik J, Puig S. Towards an Effective Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals. World Trade Review. 2023;22(5):562-583. doi:10.1017/S1474745623000253Journal
World Trade ReviewRights
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The World Trade Organization. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence.Collection Information
This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.Abstract
This Article identifies the problems of an Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals in relation with its possible benefits. We propose the inclusion of certain design features to improve the working of an eventual Appellate Mechanism and help mitigate problems related to procedural, conflict resolution, and substantive concerns. We finish by identifying the most central problems with a possible Appellate Mechanism, which helps to narrow down options within the ongoing reform process at UNCITRAL. Overall, we illustrate how institutional choice is always contextual and that all institutional options are imperfect and subject to important trade-offs. Copyright © 2023 The Author(s).Note
Open access articleISSN
1474-7456Version
Final Published Versionae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1017/S1474745623000253
Scopus Count
Collections
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The World Trade Organization. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence.

