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Towards an Effective Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals

dc.contributor.authorKucik, J.
dc.contributor.authorPuig, S.
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-06T03:50:26Z
dc.date.available2024-08-06T03:50:26Z
dc.date.issued2023-06-21
dc.identifier.citationKucik J, Puig S. Towards an Effective Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals. World Trade Review. 2023;22(5):562-583. doi:10.1017/S1474745623000253
dc.identifier.issn1474-7456
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S1474745623000253
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/673871
dc.description.abstractThis Article identifies the problems of an Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals in relation with its possible benefits. We propose the inclusion of certain design features to improve the working of an eventual Appellate Mechanism and help mitigate problems related to procedural, conflict resolution, and substantive concerns. We finish by identifying the most central problems with a possible Appellate Mechanism, which helps to narrow down options within the ongoing reform process at UNCITRAL. Overall, we illustrate how institutional choice is always contextual and that all institutional options are imperfect and subject to important trade-offs. Copyright © 2023 The Author(s).
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.rights© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The World Trade Organization. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence.
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectinternational arbitration
dc.subjectinternational dispute settlement
dc.subjectinternational institutional design
dc.subjectinternational investment law
dc.subjectISDS
dc.titleTowards an Effective Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals
dc.typeArticle
dc.typetext
dc.contributor.departmentPolitical Science and Law (by courtesy), The University of Arizona
dc.contributor.departmentInternational Economic Law, EUI Law, The Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (2023-2028), University of Arizona
dc.identifier.journalWorld Trade Review
dc.description.noteOpen access article
dc.description.collectioninformationThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.
dc.eprint.versionFinal Published Version
dc.source.journaltitleWorld Trade Review
refterms.dateFOA2024-08-06T03:50:26Z


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© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The World Trade Organization. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The World Trade Organization. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence.