Essays in Philosophy, Economics, and Law

Abstract

This Ph.D. dissertation comprises three chapters that are designed to stand independently but collectively explore the relationship between markets, individual agency, and normative systems.CHAPTER I, The Morality of Market Defense, examines the permissibility of market activism—specifically market vigilantism—as a means of effecting social change outside democratic procedures. CHAPTER II, Agency and Markets, challenges the strong libertarian claim that markets inherently achieve efficient allocations while simultaneously maximizing individual agency. CHAPTER III, Deregulating Contracts, advocates for the liberalization of procedural rules in commercial contract law for sophisticated parties, grounded in both consequentialist and deontological reasoning. Despite their varied topics, these chapters are unified by methodological, thematic, and normative dimensions. Methodologically, they adopt an interdisciplinary approach that combines economic theory with the normative and conceptual analysis of political philosophy. Thematically, they argue that under the ideal conditions of complete markets, as described by Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory, individual agency and normative systems become instrumentally irrelevant. In such markets, agency is minimized, and moral and legal rights largely lose their significance. Conversely, the opposite holds in incomplete markets. Normatively, the dissertation collectively rejects strong libertarianism. This rejection is explicit in CHAPTER II and implicit in CHAPTER I, where the critique of common good anarchism reveals inconsistencies with democratic principles. In CHAPTER III, while advocating for procedural freedom for sophisticated parties, the dissertation acknowledges that substantive contractual freedom may justifiably be restricted for both consequentialist and deontological reasons.